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INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
complaint. In all these cases, there has been a reliance by the bank upon
some course of dealing of the depositor. In the present case, no such facts
were found. It is not shown that the appellant bank knew anything about
appellee, or his partner or agent, or their business.
Upon the third ground stated above, however, the decision can be easily
supported. It could have gone on this ground alone, i. e., that inasmuch*
as there was an implied authority in Copeland, there was no forgery;
therefore the bank rightfully honored the indorsement. There is abundant
authority upon this subject. It seems that there is a presumption against
any implied authority in the agent to indorse paper for the principal,
especially where such agent is merely one to buy and sell, or to conduct the
principal's business generally; Smith v. Gibson, 6 Blackf. 369. And some
of the older cases state that such authority must be express, and cannot
be implied. However, the true rule seems to be that wherever such authority is indispensible to the execution of the particular purpose of the principal, it will be implied. See Note 71, 31 Cyc. 1382; Meecham, Agency,
2d Ed. Vol. I, Par. 971. It must be admitted that such authority is implied
only as an exception to the general rule; but the facts in this case seem to
come well within the exception. On this point in general, see Meecham,
supra, Par. 961-978.
As an incidental point, but essential to the court's decision upon the
substantive law of the case, it was necessary to dispose of the lower court's
finding of fact to the effect that "said indorsement was and is a forgery"
and "that Copeland was not the agent of appellee and was not authorized
...
. to indorse said certificate," etc. The Appellate Court considered
this a finding of ultimate facts, inconsistent with the primary findings set
out; that in such a case the inconsistent ultimate finding would be disregarded. The cases of Highway Iron Products Co. v. Phillips, 169 N. E.
878, and Smith v. Wells Co., 148 App. 333, cited in the opinion, appear,
upon examination, to support the court in this phase of its decision.
C. W. W.
SEARcH-TREsPAss-IPLiD LICENSE TO ENTER AS A DEFENSE-Officers
with a search warrant ascended an open stairway from the street to the
defendant's door. One of the officers knocked on the door and asked for
a drink of whisky. The door was voluntarily opened and the officers
entered and read the search warrant. After a search of the premises
some liquor was discovered. The defendant contended that the evidence
obtained by the search should be suppressed as the officers had entered
without demanding admission or informing the defendant or any one else
that they were officers of the law with a warrant for the search of the
house. The lower court admitted the evidence. Held: Judgment affirmed.
The evidence was admissible as the officers entered the apartment not as
trespassers but rather upon invitation. Worsdorfer v. State. Appellate
Court of Indiana, December 6, 1929, 169 N. E. 63.
If there was a license or invitation to enter here it was implied as
there was no express permission to enter given. The court held that the
voluntary opening of the door after the request for a glass of whisky constituted an implied invitation to enter.

RECENT CASE NOTES
A license is merely a permission to enter upon or do an act on land of
another which without such permission would amount to a trespass.
Clifford v. O'Neill, 42 N. Y. Supp. 607, 609. The officers had no right to
enter the defendant's house without a license express or implied. A license
to enter on property of another may be implied from the acts of the
parties, from their relations, and from custom. Gravelly Ford Canal Co. V.
Pope & Talbot Land Co., 36 Cal. App. 717, 178 Pac. 155. A license may
be inferred from the circumstances of the case. Harmon v. Ha'mon, 61
Me. 222. Thus a license may be implied to enable one to enter on another's
land if he goes there in order to transact business of the nature carried on
there, Cutler v. Smith, 57 Ill. 252. There is also an apparent extension of
this doctrine which says that a license may be implied to enter the house
of another at a usual and reasonable hour for any of the common purposes
of life. Lakin v. Ames, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 198. Such a license may not be
inferred from equivocal declarations or acts. Falls City Lumber Co. 'o.
Watkibs, 53 Ore. 212, 99 Pac. 884.
Unfortunately there are no reasoned opinions of the Indiana courts
on the precise point involved in this case but the above decisions seem to
represent the weight of modern authority on this subject. The court in
this case apparently held that the selling of whisky was a business carried
on on the premises and that a voluntary opening of the door on a request
for the commodity sold there constituted an implied invitation to enter.
It may be argued in answer to the court's line of reasoning that the ult:mate motive of the visit of the officers was not to buy whisky but to find
whisky and to make an arrest if such whisky was found. On such premise it would be more difficult to find an implied invitation to enter. The
court here seemed to base its decision on consideration of all the circumstances of the case and on that basis the case is no doubt sound. At least
the question is kept as one of fact inference. To extend the doctrine of
implied licenses much beyond that announced in this case, however, would
be treading on dangerous ground.
T. H. F.
TRUSTS-RESULTING TRUSTS-CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTE-The amended
complaint alleges that, in the year 1902, plaintiff and one Elder (defendant's deceased husband) entered into a verbal agreement whereby they were
to contribute equally to a fund which was to be held in trust by Elder for
the purchase of certain real estate; that the agreement was without fraudulent intent and each agreed to contribute one-half of the fund. Plaintiff
alleges that each contributed three hundred dollars in money and twelve
hundred dollars in mining stock, and Elder became trustee for himself and
plaintiff. Elder later purchased land with the fund and took title in his
own name in trust, it is alleged, for plaintiff and himself. Title remained
in Elder until he died in 1918. Plaintiff also alleges that defendant is the
sole beneficiary under Elder's will and that she holds title to this land in
trust for herself and plaintiff. The prayer is for partition. At the trial
there was no direct evidence of any contract between plaintiff and Elder
for the purchase of the land in question and no evidence as to how much,
if any, money was put in Elder's hands by plaintiff for the purchase of
this land, nor when such was paid. There was some evidence of Elder's
obtaining a loan on the property and that it was stated in the application

